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Abstract 
Background and Objectives: Repetitive negative thinking (RNT) is common to multiple 
emotional disorders and occurs before, during, and following a stressor. One replicated 
difference between common forms of RNT such as worry and rumination is temporal 
orientation towards a stressor, with worry being more future-oriented and rumination more 
past-oriented. Different mechanisms may drive RNT at these different time points. The 
Repetitive Thinking Questionnaire (RTQ) was developed to measure RNT as it relates to 
multiple emotions and disorders. The original RTQ measured RNT following a stressor, 
whereas a recently developed looming version (RTQ-L) measured RNT in anticipation of a 
stressor. The aims of this study were to examine the relationships between RTQ-L and 
mechanisms theorized to drive engagement in RNT, and to identify common and distinct 
mechanisms associated with RNT before and after a stressor. Method: Participants (N = 175) 
completed the RNT-L in anticipation of a stressor, along with measures of metacognitive 
beliefs, cognitive avoidance strategies, and thought control strategies. Results: Consistent 
with the original post-event version of the RTQ, the RTQ-L was associated with positive and 
negative metacognitive beliefs, cognitive avoidance, and thought control strategies, although 
there were some differences in the specific cognitive avoidance and thought control strategies 
associated with RNT at each time point. Limitations: Replication with clinical samples is 
required. The correlational design precluded causal conclusions. Conclusions: Common and 
distinct mechanisms may drive RNT before and after a stressor. 
 
 
Key Words: repetitive thinking; transdiagnostic; metacognitions; cognitive avoidance; 
thought control 
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1.0 Introduction 
Repetitive negative thinking (RNT) involves perseverative cognitive activity that 
revolves around negative themes and is subjectively experienced as difficult to control 
(Ehring & Watkins, 2008). RNT has been associated with multiple emotional disorders and is 
therefore considered to be a transdiagnostic construct (Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 
2004). Worry and rumination are two forms of RNT that have typically been examined 
within the anxiety and depression literatures, respectively. Worry is conceptualized as an 
attempt to prevent future catastrophes and is associated with increases in negative affect, 
interference with cognitive function, and inhibition of physiological processes associated 
with the extinction of fear responses (Borkovec, Alcaine, & Behar, 2004; Borkovec, Ray, & 
Stöber, 1998). Depressive rumination refers to repetitive thinking in response to sad mood in 
which the individual contemplates the causes, meanings, and implications of their mood, as 
well as problems and events from the past (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, 2004). Depressive 
rumination has been associated with the onset, maintenance, and relapse of depressive 
episodes (see Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008 for review), and experimental 
studies have reliably demonstrated a causal role of rumination on mood states (Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). 
Despite evolving within different literatures, evidence is building that worry and 
rumination may be more similar than different. Watkins, Moulds, and Mackintosh (2005) 
compared thoughts associated with worry and rumination and found that they differed on 
only seven out of 53 dimensions. In their review of the literature, Ehring and Watkins (2008) 
concluded that there are more similarities than differences across the processes of worry and 
rumination, including the fact that they are repetitive, difficult to control, negative in content, 
predominantly verbal, and relatively abstract. The only replicated differences were reported 
to be the thought content and temporal orientation, with worry more likely to be about the 
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future and depressive rumination more likely to be about the past. Another interesting 
difference found in Watkins et al.’s (2005) study was the worry was more likely to be 
associated with a feeling of insecurity, whereas rumination was more likely to be deemed to 
have a basis in reality. Together, these findings suggest that worry is more likely to be about 
future events, where an outcome is unpredictable but expected to be negative, whereas 
depressive rumination is more likely to be about past events and as such the outcome is 
known (and thus more likely to be based in reality) and is perceived to be negative. 
Extending this line of thought, Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (2008) speculated that worry may 
occur when people are uncertain, because the event is in the future, but they see the event as 
potentially controllable. Worrying is thus a strategy used to avert potentially negative 
outcomes. In contrast, rumination occurs when people are more certain about an event, given 
that it is more likely to have already occurred, and, as a consequence, the event is not 
controllable. These differences suggest that different mechanisms may contribute to RNT 
before or after a particular stressor. 
Worry and rumination have traditionally been measured using different instruments, 
such as the Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS, Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) for 
depressive rumination and the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ, Meyer, Miller, 
Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990) for worry. Although items from these scales tend to load on 
separate factors (e.g., Fresco, Frankel, Mennin, Turk, & Heimberg, 2002; Goring & 
Papageorgiou, 2008), when diagnosis-specific confounds are removed (e.g., items measuring 
depression symptoms in the RRS, different instructions, the use of the term ‘worry’ in all 
PSWQ items) they tend to load on the same factor (McEvoy, Mahoney, & Moulds, 2010), 
which supports the idea that the underlying constructs may be more similar than different. 
Importantly, the RRS and PSWQ have also both been found to be associated with symptoms 
Mechanisms Driving Repetitive Negative Thinking    5 
 
of depression and anxiety (e.g., Segerstrom, Tsao, Alden, & Craske, 2000), suggesting that 
they are not unique to a particular emotional state. 
Given the evidence that RNT is transdiagnostic, researchers have started developing 
instruments that index RNT without diagnosis-specific content. For instance, Ehring and 
colleagues (2011) recently developed the Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire (PTQ) as a 
content-independent measure of three aspects of RNT; core characteristics (repetitiveness, 
intrusiveness, and difficulties with disengagement), perceived unproductiveness, and the 
capturing of mental capacity. The PTQ was significantly associated with other measures of 
RNT and with symptoms of anxiety and depression. McEvoy et al. (2010) developed the 
Repetitive Thinking Questionnaire (RTQ) by removing diagnosis-specific content and 
instructions from three existing measures of RNT, including the PSWQ, the RRS, and the 
Post-Event Processing Questionnaire (McEvoy & Kingsep, 2006; Rachman, Grüter-Andrews, 
& Shafran, 2000), which is a measure of RNT typically used within the social phobia 
literature. McEvoy et al. found that all items from these three measures loaded on a single 
RNT factor, with the exception of the four negatively worded PSWQ items, which reflected 
an absence of RNT. Interestingly, scores from the RNT subscale were significantly and 
uniquely associated with various emotions, including anxiety, depression, shame, anger, and 
general distress. Moreover, the RNT subscale was also significantly associated with 
mechanisms theorized to driving engagement in RNT, including positive and negative 
metacognitive beliefs, cognitive avoidance, and particular thought control strategies. 
 Several models of RNT, including the Self-Regulatory Executive Function (S-REF) 
model (Wells & Matthews, 1996) and the avoidance theory of worry (Borkovec et al., 2004), 
suggest that positive and negative metacognitive beliefs and cognitive avoidance increase the 
incidence of RNT. For example, positive metabeliefs that “worrying about my problems 
helps me to cope” and “worrying will help me to solve my problems” are likely to motivate 
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engagement in RNT. Once worrying is initiated, negative metabeliefs, for example that 
worrying itself is harmful or dangerous, are likely to escalate the perceived threat from worry 
and thereby increase RNT further.  Consistent with these models, McEvoy et al. (2010) found 
that the RNT subscale of the RTQ was significantly associated with both positive and 
negative metacognitive beliefs, even when controlling for depression and anxiety symptoms. 
However, given that the original RTQ measured RNT following a stressor, the question 
remains as to whether the same beliefs are associated with RNT in anticipation of a stressor. 
Borkovec et al.’s (2004) avoidance theory suggests that worry functions as a 
misguided attempt to prevent feared outcomes or to prepare for future danger (Borkovec & 
Roemer, 1995). Consistent with this theory, worry has been associated with measures of 
experiential (Roemer, Salters, Raffa, & Orsillo, 2005) and cognitive (Sexton & Dugas, 2008) 
avoidance, and has been found to distract individuals from more distressing cognitive 
material such as negative imagery (Borkovec & Inz, 1990), and to suppress distressing 
somatic sensations (Borkovec & Hu, 1990). Depressive rumination may also serve avoidant 
functions, including avoidance of engaging in an aversive external environment, and as a 
means of justifying withdrawal, inactivity, and the relinquishing of responsibility (Martell, 
Addis, & Jacobson, 2001; Moulds, Kandris, Starr, & Wong, 2007; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 
2008). The Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire (CAQ, Gosselin et al., 2002; Sexton & 
Dugas, 2008) measures five cognitive avoidance strategies, including thought Substitution 
(replacing distressing thoughts with less distressing ones), Transformation of images into less 
distressing verbal thoughts, Distraction (e.g., I often do things to distract myself from my 
thoughts), Avoidance of stimuli that trigger unpleasant thoughts, and thought Suppression 
(deliberate attempts to remove thoughts from consciousness). Consistent with the proposal 
that RNT serves an avoidant function, McEvoy et al. (2010) found that the RNT subscale of 
the RTQ was significantly and positively correlated with all five subscales, and that the 
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Substitution, Transformation, and Avoidance scales explained unique variance in RNT, even 
when controlling for symptoms of depression and anxiety. Thus, the more individuals used 
these avoidance strategies the more RNT they reported engaging in. 
A range of additional thought control strategies have also been shown to be counter-
productive and, in fact, increase the frequency of distressing thoughts (e.g., Clark, Winton, & 
Thynn, 1993; Wegner, Schneider, Knutson, & McMahon, 1991). In an attempt to capture 
potentially maladaptive thought control strategies, Wells and Davies (1994) developed the 
Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ), which consists of five scales measuring cognitive 
Distraction (e.g., ‘I keep myself busy’), Social Control/Reassurance (e.g., ‘I talk to a friend 
about the thought’), Worry (e.g., ‘I focus on different negative thoughts’), Punishment (e.g., 
‘I punish myself for thinking the thought’), and Reappraisal (e.g., ‘I try to reinterpret the 
thought’). These researchers found that the Worry and Punishment subscales were associated 
with the PSWQ, suggesting that attempts to think about ‘other’ more minor worries and 
punishing oneself for having thoughts were both associated with more RNT. Similarly, Fehm 
and Hoyer (2004) found that the Punishment and/or Worry subscales were significantly 
associated with a broad array of measure of psychopathology, including anxiety, depression, 
worry, social anxiety, agoraphobia, and obsessive compulsive disorder. Interestingly the 
Distraction subscale was negatively associated with symptoms of depression, worry, and 
social anxiety, suggesting that distracting oneself from worries was associated with fewer 
symptoms. Coles and Heimberg (2005) compared individuals with generalized anxiety 
disorder to non-anxious controls on various thought control strategies and found that those 
with GAD were more likely to use worry and punishment (i.e., criticising oneself) but less 
likely to use social control (i.e., speaking with peers regarding their worries) or distraction. 
McEvoy et al. (2010) found that the RNT subscale of the RTQ was significantly and uniquely 
associated with Social Control, Punishment, and Reappraisal thought control strategies, such 
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that the more individuals used these strategies the more they engaged in RNT. In sum, 
punishment appears to be consistently associated with more RNT, and findings on the 
remaining thought control strategies differ somewhat between studies, which may be a 
function of different samples (e.g., clinical versus non-clinical) or different measures of RNT. 
Given the replicated differences in the temporal orientation of worry and rumination 
(i.e., future- vs. past-focus, respectively), an important question is whether or not the same 
mechanisms drive RNT both before and after a stressor. If the same mechanisms are 
associated with RNT at both time points, it would suggest that the same treatment protocol 
could be used to target both anticipatory and post-event RNT. In contrast, if different 
mechanisms were operating at each time point, it would be important to target each of these 
mechanisms in treatment. The original post-event version of the RTQ was designed to 
exclude diagnosis-specific content and its relationship to metacognitions, cognitive 
avoidance, and thought control has been previously examined (McEvoy et al., 2010). A 
looming version of the RTQ (RTQ-L) has also been recently developed, which is comprised 
of items modified from the original version so that they assess RNT in anticipation of a 
stressor. The RTQ-L is therefore uniquely placed to identify common and distinct 
mechanisms driving RNT before and after a stressor. 
The main aim of the first study was therefore to determine whether the RTQ-L would 
replicate the significant associations found between the original RTQ and positive and 
negative metacognitive beliefs, cognitive avoidance strategies, and thought control strategies. 
It was hypothesised that the RTQ-L would be significantly and positively associated with 
positive metabeliefs and with negative metabeliefs (i.e., uncontrollability and dangerousness). 
Likewise, it was expected that the RTQ-L would be associated with cognitive avoidance 
strategies, and thought control strategies, especially punishment. It was expected that all 
associations would remain significant when controlling for anxiety and depression.   
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2.0 Study 1 
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Participants 
Participants (N = 175, 61% women) were university undergraduate students with a 
mean age of 19.71 years (SD = 1.97, Range = 17 - 31). This was the same sample used to 
develop the RTQ-L (McEvoy, Moulds, & Mahoney, 2012). 
2.1.2 Measures 
2.1.2.1 Repetitive Thinking Questionnaire-Looming Version (RTQ-L, McEvoy et 
al., 2012). The RTQ-L comprised items modified from the original RTQ (McEvoy et al., 
2010). The RTQ comprised of 31-items measuring perseverative thinking independent from 
symptoms of particular disorders (e.g., including the word “depression”, the term “worry” 
was replaced by “thoughts or images”). Whereas the RTQ asked respondents to complete the 
items with reference to a recent past distressing event, the RTQ-L asked respondents to 
complete items with reference to an upcoming stressor (i.e., upcoming university exams). The 
RTQ-L is comprised of two factors. The first factor, labelled Repetitive Negative Thinking 
(RNT, 18 items), closely resembled the RNT factor in the original RTQ and included items 
reflecting engagement in repetitive thinking (e.g., I think about the situation all the time), 
negative thoughts about oneself (e.g., You have thoughts about all your shortcomings, 
failings, faults, mistakes), and ‘why’ questions (e.g., You have thoughts or images like “Why 
can’t I get going?). The second factor, labelled Isolated Contemplation (IC, 4 items), includes 
items about isolating oneself and reflecting on negative feelings, loneliness, and listening to 
sad music. These items did not load on a separate factor in the original RTQ. Internal 
consistency was very high for the RNT scale ( = .94, average inter-item correlation = .46) 
and high for the IC scale ( = .79, average inter-item correlation = .49). The RNT and IC 
scales were moderately correlated with one another (Pearson’s r = .52, p < .001). A 9-item 
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version of the RNT (i.e., RNT-Short scale) was correlated very highly (r = .97) with the full 
18-item version, and was found to have almost identical psychometric properties (McEvoy et 
al., 2012). Ratings were made across a 5-point response scale: Not true at all (1), Somewhat 
true (3), or Very true (5). 
2.1.2.2 Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire – 30 (MCQ-30; Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 
2004). The MCQ-30 measures five domains of positive and negative metacognitive beliefs, 
metacognitive monitoring, and judgments of cognitive confidence. The five subscales are: (1) 
positive beliefs about worry, (2) negative beliefs about uncontrollability and danger, (3) 
cognitive confidence (assessing confidence in attention and memory), (4) negative beliefs 
concerning the consequences of not controlling thoughts, and (5) cognitive self-
consciousness (the tendency to focus attention on thought processes). Wells and Cartwright-
Hatton (2004) reported good internal consistency (r = .72- .92) and test-retest reliability  (r = 
,59 - .87) across the total score and subscales, as well as providing evidence for the factor 
structure and convergent validity . The 4-point response scale is: Do not agree (1), Agree 
slightly (2), Agree moderately (3), or Agree very much (4). As in the RTQ, references to 
worry were replaced by references to thoughts and thinking (e.g., ‘Worrying about my 
problems helps me cope’ became ‘Thinking about my problems helps me cope’). Cronbach’s 
alphas ranged from .78 to .89 in the current study, which were indicative of high internal 
consistencies across the subscales. 
2.1.2.3 Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ; Wells & Davies, 1994). This 30-item 
measure assesses various strategies used to control unpleasant or unwanted thoughts. Five 
subscales describe the different strategies: (1) distraction, (2) social control, (3) punishment, 
(4) worry, and (5) reappraisal. Each item is endorsed on a four-point rating scale as follows; 
Never (1), Sometimes (2), Often (3), or Almost Always (4). Data concerning internal 
consistency (α across subscales = .65- .78), factor structure, sensitivity to change, and 
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convergent and discriminant validity have been provided (Reynolds & Wells, 1999). Internal 
consistencies in the current study ranged from .71 to .83. 
2.1.2.4 Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire (CAQ; Gosselin et al., 2002; Sexton & 
Dugas, 2008). The CAQ is a 25-item measure that assesses an individual’s use of five 
cognitive avoidance strategies in response to threatening thoughts. Subscales measure the 
strategies of: (1) thought substitution, (2) transformation of images into verbal thoughts, (3) 
distraction, (4) avoidance of stimuli that trigger unpleasant thoughts, and (5) thought 
suppression. Participants respond along a 5-point scale ranging from Not at all typical (1) to 
Completely typical (5). The English version of the CAQ demonstrates good internal 
consistency (α = .73-.95) and test–retest reliability (r = .70-.85; Sexton & Dugas, 2008). 
Sexton and Dugas also found support for the measure’s factor structure, convergent validity, 
and divergent validity. Internal consistencies in the current study ranged from .75 to .91. 
2.1.2.5 Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988). The 
BAI consists of 21 items and measures the severity of anxiety symptoms over the previous 
week. Reliability and validity are established; internal consistency reliability coefficients 
range from .85 and .94, with a test-retest reliability coefficient of .75. 
2.1.2.6 Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The BDI-
II is a 21-item measure of depression symptoms experienced during the previous fortnight. 
Internal consistency (α = .92) and test-retest reliability (r = .93 over 1 week) are established 
(Beck et al., 1996), and evidence for construct validity has been demonstrated (e.g., Dozois, 
Dobson, & Ahnberg, 1998; Osman, Kopper, Barrios, Gutierrez, & Bagge, 2004). Support for 
convergent and discriminant validity has also been reported (Osman, Downs, Barrios, 
Kopper, Guitierrez, & Chiros, 1997; Steer, Ball, Ranieri, & Beck, 1997). 
2.1.3 Procedure 
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 Participants were first year undergraduate psychology students who received credit 
towards their course requirements for their involvement. Participants were recruited in the 
weeks leading up to their end of semester university exams, with the questionnaires being 
completed an average of 18.27 days (SD = 10.51) prior to the first exam in the reference 
period. The mean number of exams to be sat during the upcoming reference period was 2.87 
(SD = 1.21). Participants were instructed to complete the RTQ-L with reference to their 
feelings and experiences in anticipation of the upcoming university exams. They were then 
asked to complete the remaining measures (MCQ-30, BDI-II, BAI, TCQ, and CAQ). This 
study received approval from the School of Psychology’s Human Research Ethics Panel 
(HREAP, Behavioral) at The University of New South Wales. 
2.2 Results 
2.2.1 Relationships Between the RTQ-L Scales and Metacognitions 
The RNT scale was significantly correlated with the total score and all five MCQ-30 
subscales (Table 1). The IC scale was significantly correlated with the total score and all 
MCQ-30 subscales, except the Positive Beliefs scale. In order to control for symptoms of 
depression and anxiety, and thus the influence of current mood state on associations, BDI and 
BAI scores were entered into the first step of a hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis 
(HMLR), followed by the MCQ-30 subscales in a second step (Table 2). Separate models 
were run for the RNT and IC scales. As predicted, Uncontrollability and Dangerousness 
beliefs were significant and positive predictors of the RNT and IC scales, suggesting that 
higher scores on these scales were associated with more repetitive thinking. Also as 
predicted, the Positive Beliefs scale was positively associated with RNT scores. In addition, 
the Cognitive Confidence scale was negatively associated with IC scores, such that higher 
levels of confidence in attention and memory were associated with less IC. 
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2.2.2 Relationships between the RTQ-L Scales and Cognitive Avoidance 
Strategies 
 The RNT and IC scales were significantly correlated with the CAQ total score and all 
five subscales (Table 1). Once again, BDI and BAI were entered on the first step of a HMLR 
in separate models for the RNT and IC. When the CAQ subscales were entered into the 
second step, only the Substitution scale was a significant and unique predictor (Table 2). The 
association was positive but weak, suggesting that higher levels of RNT were associated with 
the tendency to substitute distressing thoughts and images for less distressing ones. The CAQ 
scales did not add a significant proportion of explanatory power above and beyond the BDI 
and BAI for the IC scale. 
2.2.3 Relationships between the RTQ-L Scales and Thought Control Strategies 
 The RNT scale was also significantly correlated with the TCQ total score as well as 
the Worry, Punishment, and Reappraisal subscales, whereas the IC scale was significantly 
correlated with the total score, Worry, and Punishment subscales (Table 1). TCQ subscales 
found to have significant bivariate correlations with the RNT and IC subscales were then 
entered in the second step of separate HMLRs. BDI and BAI were entered in step 1. The 
Worry, Punishment, and Reappraisal scales remained significant predictors of RNT, such that 
higher scores on these scales were associated with higher RNT scores (Table 2). In contrast, 
the second step failed to explain a significant proportion of additional variance in IC. 
2.3 Discussion for Study 1 
 It was hypothesized that the RTQ-L would replicate the significant associations 
demonstrated between the original RTQ and positive and negative metacognitive beliefs, 
cognitive avoidance strategies, and thought control strategies (McEvoy et al., 2010). The 
RNT scale was significantly correlated with all MCQ-30 subscales, although, as predicted, 
only uniquely with the Positive Beliefs and Uncontrollability and Dangerousness scales. Also 
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consistent with the original RTQ, the cognitive avoidance strategy of Substitution as 
measured by the CAQ was uniquely associated with the RNT scale. The Substitution scale 
measures strategies such as thinking about other people’s problems instead of one’s own, and 
thinking about trivial details rather than details that are more worrying. Given that this scale 
measures strategic repetitive thinking, albeit about potentially more benign aspects of 
problems, it is not surprising that it was uniquely and positively associated with the RNT 
scale. The Transformation and Avoidance scales of the CAQ were also associated with RNT 
in the original post-event version but not the looming version in this study, which may 
suggest that these strategies are more powerful drivers of post-event relative to anticipatory 
RNT. It may be that once an outcome is perceived to be negative following an event, and thus 
can no longer be controlled, then trying to transform distressing images into verbal thoughts 
or to avoid thoughts about the event altogether are seen as some of the few options available 
to cope with distressing emotions. In contrast, before a stressor these strategies for controlling 
RNT may be perceived to be less helpful than more direct attempts at preventing the negative 
outcome, and thus they may be less likely to be utilized. 
The thought control strategies of Worry, Punishment, and Reappraisal were all 
positively associated with anticipatory RNT, suggesting that attempting to engage in more 
benign verbal worries, punishing oneself for having thoughts, and reappraising one’s 
thoughts were all associated with more anticipatory RNT. Interestingly, the TCQ-Worry 
subscale was not associated with the original post-event version of the RTQ, although the 
association with the RNT scale was weak in this study. This finding suggests that the extent 
to which individuals attempted to direct their attention to less distressing worries was 
paradoxically associated with more RNT, and that this strategy was somewhat unique to 
anticipatory RNT. In contrast, the TCQ-Social Control scale was associated with the post-
event version of the RTQ but not the looming version used in this study, suggesting that there 
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was no significant relationship between seeking support from one’s social network and the 
extent of anticipatory RNT. Punishment and Reappraisal were associated with more RNT in 
both the post-event and looming versions, suggesting that these strategies may drive RNT 
regardless of the temporal orientation of the stressor. 
One of the main limitations of Study 1 was that direct comparisons between pre- and 
post-stressor RNT could not be made within the same sample. Differences between 
mechanisms driving pre- and post-stressor RNT in Study 1 and the original study could be 
due to differences across the samples, rather than differences across the processes driving 
RNT at the two time points. Study 2 was designed to address this limitation. 
3.0 Study 2 
3.1 Aim 
 The main aim of Study 2 was to test if the unique associations with MCQ-30, CAQ, 
and TCQ subscales found with pre-stressor (Study 1) and post-stressor (McEvoy et al., 2010) 
RNT would be replicated when RNT is measured at both time points within the same sample. 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants 
Participants (N = 91, 82.4% women) were a new sample of university undergraduate 
students with a mean age of 20.11 years (SD = 4.18, Range = 17 - 42). Most were single 
(94.5%) with high school as the highest qualification (90.1%), and of Asian (48%) or 
Caucasian (30%) ethnicity. Almost half (42%) were employed. 
3.2.2 Measures 
 The same measures were administered in Study 2 as in Study 3, with the addition of 
the original, post-stressor version of the RTQ (McEvoy et al, 2010) and the negative affect 
subscale of the PANAS. 
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3.2.2.1 Repetitive Thinking Questionnaire (RTQ, McEvoy et al., 2010). The RTQ is 
a 31-item self-report measure of perseverative thinking comprising of two subscales; 
Repetitive Negative Thinking (RNT, 27 items) and Absence of Repetitive Thinking (ART, 4 
items). The ART subscale comprised of the negatively worded items that are largely 
unrelated to symptoms and mechanisms (McEvoy et al., 2010), so it was not examined in this 
study. Items are rated along a 5-point scale: Not at all true (1), Somewhat true (3), or Very 
true (5). The factor structure, internal consistency (α = .72 - .93), convergent validity, and 
predictive utility of the RTQ have been demonstrated in student (McEvoy et al., 2010) and 
clinical (Mahoney et al., 2012) samples. Temporal orientation was standardised by asking 
participants to complete the RTQ items in reference to their experience following the stressor. 
3.2.2.2 Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988). The 10-item Negative Affect subscale of the PANAS was used to measure the range 
and degree of negative emotions experienced by participants in anticipation of the reference 
distressing situation. The negative emotions include: distressed, upset, guilty, scared, hostile, 
irritable, ashamed, nervous, jittery, and afraid, and are rated on a 5-point response scale; 
Very slightly or not at all (1), A little (2), Moderately (3), Quite a bit (4) or Extremely (5). 
Crawford and Henry (2004) have provided evidence of internal consistency (α = .85- .89) and 
construct validity (including convergent and divergent validity) for the PANAS. For 
consistency with the original RTQ study, we examined associations between the RTQ (pre- 
and post-stressor) and PANAS total score (pre- and post-stressor Cronbach’s αs = .91 and .92 
in this study, respectively), as well as four subscales derived from a factor analysis in the 
original study (McEvoy et al., 2010). Anxiety included the items nervous, afraid, scared, and 
jittery. Anger included the items irritable and hostile. Shame included the items guilty and 
ashamed. General Distress included the items distressed and upset. Average scale scores 
were calculated for each of these factors. 
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3.2.3 Procedure 
 As in Study 1, participants were first year undergraduate psychology students who 
completed the questionnaires an average of 11.89 days (SD = 4.47) prior to their first exam in 
the reference period. The mean number of exams was 2.21 (SD = .99). Participants were 
instructed to complete the RTQ-L with reference to their feelings and experiences in 
anticipation of their upcoming university exams. They were then asked to complete the 
remaining measures (PANAS, MCQ-30, BDI-II, BAI, TCQ, and CAQ). The new element to 
this study was that participants completed the original post-stressor version of the RTQ, along 
with the PANAS, MCQ-30, BDI-II, and BAI, an average of 8.04 days (SD = 6.23) following 
their final exam.  The TCQ and CAQ were only completed prior to the exam period. This 
study received approval from the School of Psychology’s Human Research Ethics Panel 
(HREAP, Behavioral) at The University of New South Wales. 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Descriptive statistics and internal reliability 
The full RNT subscales were highly correlated across the two time points (r = .70, p < 
.001), as were the two short forms (r = .64, p < .001). The average RNT rating prior to the 
stressor (M = 2.69, SD = .84) was significantly higher than afterwards (M = 1.67, SD = .62), 
t(90) = 16.16, p < .001, d = 1.40. Cronbach’s alphas were high: RNT-pre (.93), RNT-pre 
short (.89), RNT-post (.96), RNT-post short (.93). [NEED TO REPORT PSYCHOMETRICS 
OF THE IC SCALE as well as MCQ, CAQ, TCA] The Number of Days the questionnaires 
were completed before and after exams was not correlated with total RNT-pre (r = -.12, p > 
.05) or RNT-post (r = .09, p > .05) subscale scores. 
3.3.2 Bivariate correlations between the RTQ and mechanisms scales 
Table 1 reports Pearson bivariate correlation coefficients between the pre- and post-
stressor RNT subscale scores (total and short versions) and MCQ-30, CAQ, and TCQ 
Mechanisms Driving Repetitive Negative Thinking    18 
 
subscales. Correlations with the IC subscale are reported for the looming version, but the 
main aim of this study was to compare the RNT constructs at each time point so this subscale 
is not considered further. The MCQ total score and all subscales except the Positive Beliefs 
subscale were significantly and positively correlated with pre- and post-stressor RNT. The 
association between the Cognitive Self-Consciousness subscale and post-event RNT (short 
scale) just fell short of statistical significance. Pre- and post-stressor RNT were significantly 
and positively correlated with the CAQ total and all subscales. The Worry and Punishment 
subscales of the TCQ were significantly and positively correlated, whereas the Social Control 
subscale was significantly and negatively correlated, with pre- and post-stressor RNT. 
3.3.3 Hierarchical MLRs predicting pre- and post-stressor RNT 
 Table 3 shows that BDI-II and BAI scores significantly predicted RNT at both time 
points. A series of HMLR analyses were then conducted for pre- and post-stressor RNT 
separately. When pre-stressor RNT was the criterion variable, pre-stressor BDI-II and BAI 
were entered as step 1, and MCQ, CAQ, or TCQ subscale scores were entered in step 2 of 
separate models. When post-stressor RNT was the criterion variable, and post-stressor BDI-II 
and BAI were entered in step 1 and post-stressor MCQ subscale scores were entered in step 2 
of separate models. However, because the CAQ and TCQ were only completed at the first 
time point, both pre- and post-stressor BDI-II and BAI scores were entered in step 1 to 
control for depression and anxiety when the CAQ and TCQ were completed and when the 
post-stressor RNT subscale was completed. For the MCQ, the Uncontrollability and 
Dangerousness and Need for Control subscales were the only unique predictors of both pre- 
and post-stressor RNT. For the CAQ, step 2 added significant explanatory power overall for 
pre-stressor RNT, but no single scale remained as a unique predictor. The CAQ did not add 
explanatory power for post-stressor RNT. For the TCQ, only the Punishment subscale 
remained as a unique predictor for both pre- and post-stressor RNT. 
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 3.3.4 Relationships between emotions and pre- and post-stressor RNT 
 Pre- and post-stressor RNT was significantly correlated with the total PANAS score 
(rs = .75 and .64, respectively, ps < .001). The relationship between various emotions and 
RNT were then examined by simultaneously entering four PANAS subscales (anxiety, anger, 
shame, and general distress) previously used to examine the relationship between the RTQ 
and emotions (McEvoy et al., 2010; McEvoy et al., 2012) into multiple linear regressions 
predicting pre- and post-stressor RNT separately. BDI-II was also entered as a predictor to 
control for general mood state. These models explained a large proportion of the variance in 
both pre- and post-stressor RNT, with the Anxiety subscale of the PANAS and the BDI-II 
being significant unique predictors (Table 4). The general distress subscale was also a unique 
predictor of pre-stressor RNT. 
4.0 General Discussion 
[focus on commonalities and differences across all studies. Relate similarities to theory and 
previous findings. Speculate on differences due to method, sample, theory, etc.]  
 
The original Repetitive Thinking Questionnaire (RTQ; McEvoy et al., 2010) was developed 
as a trans-emotional and trans-diagnostic measure of RNT. The original RTQ instructed 
respondents to indicate their degree of engagement in repetitive thinking following a recent 
distressing event. A looming version of the RTQ (RTQ-L) was recently developed to measure 
RNT with reference to an upcoming stressor and was found to comprise two factors (McEvoy 
et al., 2011). The RNT factor of the RTQ-L was similar to the RNT factor in the original 
RTQ and measured engagement in repetitive thinking, negative thoughts about oneself, and 
‘why’ questions (e.g., You have thoughts or images like “Why can’t I get going?). The 
Isolated Contemplation (IC) factor included items about isolating oneself and reflecting on 
negative feelings, loneliness, and listening to sad music. The RNT scales of the RTQ and 
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RTQ-L were found to be significantly and uniquely associated with an array of negative 
emotions (anxiety, depression, shame, anger, general distress), and the original RTQ was 
associated with mechanisms theorized to driving engagement in RNT, including positive and 
negative metacognitive beliefs, cognitive avoidance strategies, and thought control strategies. 
Given that two forms of RNT, namely worry and rumination, have been found to differ in 
temporal orientation to a stressor (future- vs. past- orientation, respectively), it may be that 
different mechanisms drive RNT before and after a stressor. By using a common 
transdiagnostic measure of RNT, this study was uniquely placed to identify whether or not 
similar mechanisms are associated with RNT in anticipation of and following a stressor, by 
comparing findings from the RTQ-L to those of the original RTQ (McEvoy et al., 2010).  
[Placed in Study 1 Discussion: It was hypothesized that the RTQ-L would replicate 
the significant associations demonstrated between the original RTQ and positive and negative 
metacognitive beliefs, cognitive avoidance strategies, and thought control strategies (McEvoy 
et al., 2010). The RNT scale was significantly correlated with all MCQ-30 subscales, 
although, as predicted, only uniquely with the Positive Beliefs and Uncontrollability and 
Dangerousness scales.] These two MCQ-30 scales were the only two that uniquely predicted 
RNT in the original post-event version of the RTQ (McEvoy et al., 2010). This finding 
suggests that respondents engaged in RNT to the degree that they believed RNT was helpful, 
uncontrollable, and dangerous regardless of the temporal orientation to the stressor, and is 
consistent with Wells and Matthews (1996) Self-Regulatory Executive Function (S-REF) 
model. The S-REF model proposes that positive beliefs initiate repetitive thinking which, in 
turn, is maintained in part by uncontrollability and dangerousness beliefs because they lead to 
dysfunctional thought control strategies. Our findings suggest that metacognitive beliefs 
predict both post-event and anticipatory RNT. 
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[Also consistent with the original RTQ, the cognitive avoidance strategy of 
Substitution as measured by the CAQ was uniquely associated with the RNT scale. The 
Substitution scale measures strategies such as thinking about other people’s problems instead 
of one’s own, and thinking about trivial details rather than details that are more worrying. 
Given that this scale measures strategic repetitive thinking, albeit about potentially more 
benign aspects of problems, it is not surprising that it was uniquely and positively associated 
with the RNT scale.] The findings that (a) all of the CAQ subscales were moderately 
correlated with RNT, (b) adding the CAQ subscales in the hierarchical MLR explained a 
significant proportion of variance in RNT above and beyond depression and anxiety 
symptoms, but (c) that only the Substitution scale was uniquely associated with RNT, 
suggests that cognitive avoidance is related to more RNT but that most of the variance is 
shared across the CAQ subscales. [The Transformation and Avoidance scales of the CAQ 
were also associated with RNT in the original post-event version but not the looming version 
in this study, which may suggest that these strategies are more powerful drivers of post-event 
relative to anticipatory RNT. It may be that once an outcome is perceived to be negative 
following an event, and thus can no longer be controlled, then trying to transform distressing 
images into verbal thoughts or to avoid thoughts about the event altogether are seen as some 
of the few options available to cope with distressing emotions. In contrast, before a stressor 
these strategies for controlling RNT may be perceived to be less helpful than more direct 
attempts at preventing the negative outcome, and thus they may be less likely to be utilized.] 
These possibilities are speculative but provide intriguing avenues for future research. 
[The thought control strategies of Worry, Punishment, and Reappraisal were all 
positively associated with anticipatory repetitive thinking as measured by the RNT scale. 
This finding suggests that attempting to engage in more benign verbal worries, punishing 
oneself for having thoughts, and reappraising one’s thoughts were all associated with more 
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anticipatory RNT. Interestingly, the TCQ-Worry subscale was not associated with the 
original post-event version of the RTQ, although the association with the RNT scale was 
weak in this study. This finding suggests that the extent to which individuals attempted to 
direct their attention to less distressing worries was paradoxically associated with more RNT, 
and that this strategy was somewhat unique to anticipatory RNT. In contrast, the TCQ-Social 
Control scale was associated with the post-event version of the RTQ but not the looming 
version used in this study, suggesting that there was no significant relationship between 
seeking support from one’s social network and the extent of anticipatory RNT. Punishment 
and Reappraisal were associated with more RNT in both the post-event and looming versions, 
suggesting that these strategies may drive RNT regardless of the temporal orientation of the 
stressor.] 
 The pattern of relationships between the IC scale and metacognitions, cognitive 
avoidance, and thought control strategies differed from those of the RNT scale. In terms of 
metacognitions, the Cognitive Confidence subscale, which indexes trust in one’s memory, 
was negative and uniquely associated with IC such that more confidence in memory (i.e., 
lower scores on the MCQ subscale) was associated with more engagement in IC. This finding 
is inconsistent with predictions based on the S-REF model, which suggests that less 
Cognitive Confidence should be associated with more engagement in RNT. However, the IC 
scale’s associations with the other constructs suggests that aspects of IC may actually be less 
pathological than RNT. For instance, in terms of positive metabeliefs, IC was most strongly 
associated with potentially realistic beliefs that thinking about one’s thoughts, feelings, 
problems, and life can help to understand these experiences and remain organized. IC was not 
associated with potentially less realistic positive beliefs that thinking about one’s experience 
is helpful in more practical respects (e.g., prevent or solve problems). Moreover, the CAQ 
and TCQ scales failed to explain a significant proportion of additional variance in IC above 
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and beyond BDI and BAI, suggesting that IC was not significantly associated with cognitive 
avoidance or thought control strategies once current mood state was accounted for. While the 
Uncontrollability and Dangerousness scale of the MCQ was associated with IC, this 
association was substantially weaker than that with the RNT scale. As mentioned above, 
some but not all of the items included in the IC factor have been associated with less 
psychopathology over time in previous research (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2003), although we note some contradictory findings (e.g., Calmes & Roberts, 2007).  
This study has limitations that must be considered. First, further research testing the 
reliability and generalizability of our findings to clinical samples and a broader array of 
stressors is required. Second, the cross-sectional and correlational design of our study 
precludes causal conclusions. Prospective and experimental designs are required to better 
understand the temporal and causal relationships between RNT, metacognitions, thought 
control, and cognitive avoidance strategies. Third, because the RTQ was developed from 
existing measures of RNT it was not designed a priori to measure particular components of 
maladaptive RNT. In contrast, the PTQ (Ehring et al., 2011) was recently developed as a 
measure of the higher order RNT construct as well as three lower-order factors representing 
core characteristics of RNT (repetitiveness, intrusiveness, difficulties with disengagement), 
perceived unproductiveness of RNT, and RNT capturing mental capacity. Future research 
examining the mechanisms maintaining each of these lower order features of RNT may be 
helpful to further refine theory and treatment innovations.  
This study found evidence that mechanisms associated with post-event RNT are also 
associated with anticipatory RNT, although there were some differences in the types of 
cognitive avoidance strategies and thought control strategies associated with RNT at each 
time point. Positive metabeliefs, and negative metabeliefs, relating to uncontrollability and 
dangerousness of thoughts and images, were common to both anticipatory and post-event 
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processing. These findings suggest that treatment strategies designed to modify 
metacognitions, cognitive avoidance, and thought control strategies are likely to ameliorate 
engagement in both anticipatory and post-event RNT. Together, our findings suggested that 
items in the RNT scale may reflect a more pathological process than those in the IC scale. 
This study is one of the first to examine anticipatory RNT and to compare findings to post-
event RNT using the same measure. The RTQ appears to be a useful tool with which to 
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